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Abstract
A dynamic provisioning system is one of the instruments that regulators could use
for introducing counter-cyclicality into prudential regulation. The potential e¤ective-
ness of such instrument depends on how far actual provisioning practices exacerbate
growth in bank lending. We therefore investigate the e¤ects of loan loss provisions
on growth in bank lending, making a di¤erence between non discretionary and dis-
cretionary loan loss provisions. International comparisons are made between ve ge-
ographical areas : Europe, Japan, the United-States, Central & South American and
South & East Asia. Except for Japanese banks, we nd a negative and signicant ef-
fect of non discretionary loan loss provisions on growth in bank lending. This common
feature lead us to conclude that banking regulators could reach a consensus concerning
the benecial aspects of a dynamic provisioning system.
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1. Introduction
The nancial crisis that started in 2007 puts forward the need for introducing counter-
cyclicality into prudential regulation as one of the most destabilizing elements of the crisis
has been the procyclical amplication of nancial shocks throughout the banking system, -
nancial markets and the broader economy. Several recommendations have been proposed by
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2011) under Basel III to reduce the role of the
procyclical factors. Some of these measures concern the adjustment of the regulatory capital
requirement with the aim to dampen its cyclicality. The Committee is looking to focus on
long-term calibration of the probability of default in the modeling of risk, to introduce a
downturn loss-given default and to use an appropriate calibration of the risk functions with
parameters that can better reect "through the cycle" e¤ects. The Committee is further
proposing to adjust the capital bu¤er range, established through the capital conservation
mechanism, to ensure that banking sector capital requirements take account of the macro-
nancial environment in which banks operate. Bank regulators can slowly increase their
capital requirements when excess aggregate credit growth is judged to be associated with
a build-up of system-wide risk, signaling those requirements clearly one year in advance.
These higher capital requirements will ensure that the banking system has a bu¤er of cap-
ital to protect it against future potential losses. The Basel Committee is also promoting
forward-looking provisioning1 by strongly supporting the IABS principles to base it on the
"expected" (rather than the current "incurred") losses of banks existing portfolios. This
requires changing the accounting standard towards an expected loss approach. The Com-
mittee issued for that a set of high level guiding principles that should govern the reforms
to the replacement of IAS 392.
1In a dynamic provisioning system, a new element, called the statistical provisions, is introduced. These
statistical provisions are dened by accounting rules to cover expected losses. Banks have to evaluate the
latent risk over a whole business cycle of their loan portfolio. Statistical provisions are dened as the
di¤erence between the estimation of latent losses and specic provisions. During an upswing phase, specic
provisions are generally low and banks can therefore build up a fund of statistical provisions. Conversely,
during a downturn, specic provisions increase and can be greater than latent losses, which means that
the fund of statistical provisions previously accumulated is used to cope with numerous contemporaneous
problem loans. As a result, statistical provisions o¤set the counter-cyclical evolutions of specic provisions,
and total loan loss provisions are smoothed over time. See Saurina (2009) for more details.
2See Guiding principles for the revision of accounting standards for nancial instruments issued by the
Basel Committee, August 2009.
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According to the limitations of each instrument and/or the complexity of the procyclical-
ity in banking activities, the regulatory framework should be based on the complementarity
of instruments and should combine the proposals of the Basel Committee to address pro-
cyclicality. However, all countries (except Spain) that already planned to implement Basel
III mainly focus on the capital measures, but do not consider replacing the backward looking
provisioning system with the suggested forward-looking provisioning system. The main issue
in this context is to determine if provisioning practices have pro-cyclical e¤ects and how far
banks underestimate risks during cyclical upturns.
This paper contributes to this debate by investigating if existing backward-looking pro-
visioning practices exacerbate growth in lending. Indeed, this point is essential to assess if
a dynamic provisioning system would be appropriate for smoothing growth in bank lending.
However, provisioning practices and their eventual e¤ects on growth in lending may di¤er no-
ticeably in di¤erent banking systems. This could make it di¢cult to reach an international
consensus between banking regulators concerning the adoption of a dynamic provisioning
system. Our aim is therefore to empirically determine if there are country di¤erences in
the way provisioning practices a¤ect growth in bank lending. More precisely, we consider
three samples of developed countries: Europe, the United States, Japan; and two samples of
emerging countries: Central & South America and South & East Asia.
While this issue is potentially important for banking regulators, the existing theoretical
and empirical literatures are not very well developed. Bouvatier and Lepetit (2012) and
Bouvatier and Lepetit (2011) use a partial equilibrium model to show that a backward-
looking provisioning system amplies the procyclicality of loan markets whereas such an
e¤ect disappears when statistical provisions are used to smooth the evolution of total loan
loss provisions. Working on a panel of European commercial banks for the period 1992-2004,
Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008) nd that loan loss provisions (LLP) made in order to cover
expected future loan losses (non-discretionary LLP) amplify growth in lending. By contrast,
loan loss provisions used for management objectives (discretionary LLP) do not have a
signicant e¤ect. We extend this work by making international comparisons on the e¤ects
of loan loss provisioning practices on growth in lending. We consider commercial banks, but
also cooperative & mutual banks and savings banks for three samples of developed countries
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(Europe, Japan and the United States) and two samples of emerging countries (Central &
South America and South & East Asia).
Our results show that non-discretionary loan loss provisions under a backward-looking
provisioning system impact signicantly on growth in lending in all the countries we consider,
except for Japan. In addition, this e¤ect is stronger in emerging countries and in Europe
than in the United States (U.S.). As we show that a backward-looking provisioning system
amplies the procyclicality of bank lending in a large set on countries, our results support
the proposal of the Basel Committee to implement a forward-looking provisioning system
at the international level in addition to the capital measures already adopted to address
procyclicality.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents data and descriptive
statistics. Section 3 presents the estimates on the determination of loan loss provisions.
Section 4 discusses the e¤ects of loan loss provisions on growth in bank lending. Section 5
concludes the paper.
2. Datasets and descriptive statistics
We consider ve di¤erent geographical areas: Europe, Japan, the United States, Central
& South America and South & East Asia. We use (unconsolidated) nancial statement data
extracted from Bankscope. We use information on commercial, cooperative & mutual and
savings banks. Table A1 in the appendix gives a breakdown of banks by country and bank
type.
Our European dataset covers the period 1995-2008 and includes commercial, cooperative
& mutual and savings banks for the following countries3: Denmark, France, Italy, Norway,
Spain4, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom. Bankscope provides information on
income statements and balance sheets for 3040 commercial, cooperative &mutual and savings
3We extracted data from 17 European countries (the European Union at 15, plus Norway and Switzer-
land), but for some countries a majority of banks does not provide information on some variables needed
by this study (especially non performing loans and total capital ratio). So nally, we only end up with 8
European countries and have to drop Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg,
Netherlands and Portugal. We also do not include in our sample Eastern and Central Europe as Bankscope
provides information on some variables we need (such as non-performing loans) for only few banks.
4As Spain implemented a dynamic provisioning system in 2000, we only keep in our sample data on
spanish banks for the period 1995-1999.
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banks for these 8 countries. Not all these banks do provide information on the variables
needed for this study, especially non-performing loans and total capital ratio. After data
cleaning, we end up with an unbalanced panel of 1636 banks. The weight of Italian banks
is preponderant in our European dataset due to the important number of cooperative banks
in Italy and to the good reporting of these banks in Bankscope. This point will be carefully
considered during the estimations, running subsample estimations without Italian banks.
We identify 10296 U.S. commercial and savings banks for which income statements and
balance sheets are provided for the period 1995-20085. Information availability on our vari-
ables of interest and data cleaning leave us with an unbalanced panel of 9421 U.S. banks.
The Central & South America dataset covers the period 1995-2008 for the following coun-
tries : Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay,
Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. Data availability for other Central & South America coun-
tries is limited (considering variables needed for this study). Bankscope provides information
on 895 banks from these 12 countries. Information availability on our variables of interest
and data cleaning leave us with an unbalanced panel of 632 banks. These banks are mainly
commercial banks. We are not able to include the total capital ratio in our estimates for
this dataset because only 25% of banks provide this information.
Bankscope provides information on 968 Japanese commercial and cooperative & mutual
banks6, but only 166 over these 968 banks have nancial statement information available for
the period 1995-1997. We therefore decided to restrict our analysis to a shorter period for
Japanese banks, from 1998 to 2008. Information availability and data cleaning leave us with
an unbalanced panel of 689 Japanese banks. As for Central & South American banks, we
also dropped the total capital ratio from our estimations in this sample because this variable
is provided only for 35% of our dataset.
Finally, as for Japan, data availability in Bankscope for South & East Asian banks over
the period 1995-1997 is very weak. Our dataset for the South & East Asian banks covers
therefore the period 1998-2008 for the following countries : Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia,
5Cooperative & mutual american banks are not included in our analysis as nancial information is only
available for 6 banks.
6Japanese savings banks are not included in our analysis as nancial information is only available for one
of them.
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Philippines, Taiwan and Thailand7. Bankscope provides information for 395 banks in these
6 countries. Information availability and data cleaning leave us with an unbalanced panel of
245 banks.
Table 1 presents some general descriptive statistics for our di¤erent datasets. Loans
are the main bank assets and deposits are the main resources in our ve datasets. The
ratio of loans to total asset is between 51.96% for Central & South American banks and
66.79% for European banks (without Italy). Considering deposits to total assets, this ratio
is between 64.41% for Italian banks and 92.16% for Japanese banks. Mean tests8 highlight
signicant di¤erences in the quality of loan portfolios. U.S. banks present the lowest ratio
of non-performing loans to total assets while Japanese banks display the highest ratio. Note
that U.S. banks have a relatively high ratio of loan loss provisions compared to their ratio
of non-performing loans while Japanese banks make relatively few loan loss provisions. We
also nd signicant di¤erences in terms of protability. Japanese banks are on average
the last protable with negative return on assets and return on equity, whereas U.S. banks
and Central & South American banks are more protable than European or South & East
Asian banks. Mean tests further show that growth rates in bank lending and deposits are
particularly weak for Japanese banks. The growth rate in bank lending is 2.29% for Japanese
banks while it is around 10% for other datasets.
[Insert Table 1]
3. Decomposition of loan loss provisions
The literature on provisioning practices shows that loan loss provisions are made up of two
components. The non-discretionary component represents loan loss provisions made to cover
expected credit losses (Whalen, 1994; Beaver and Engel, 1996, Hasan and Wall, 2004). With
backward-looking practices, this component is mainly related to the identication of problem
loans (i.e. non-performing loans) and exhibits a cyclical pattern (Laeven and Majnoni, 2003;
Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005). The discretionary component captures loan loss provisions
7Bankscope does not provide enough information on the others South & East Asian countries (considering
variables needed by this study) to include them in our analysis.
8These tests are available upon request.
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made for managerial objectives such as income smoothing, capital management or signalling
(Ahmed et al., 1999; Hasan and Wall, 2004; Kanagaretnam et al., 2004; Anandarajan et al.,
2007; Fonseca and Gonzalez, 2008; Kanagaretnam et al., 2009). We need to di¤erentiate
these two components to accurately analyze if non-discretionary LLP have an e¤ect on
growth in lending.
3.1. The empirical specication
We use an empirical specication based on Ahmed et al. (1999) and Bouvatier and
Lepetit (2008) to decompose loan loss provisions into non-discretionary and discretionary
LLP.
In a backward-looking provisioning system, non-discretionary LLP are mainly related to
non-performing loans. We use the ratio of non-performing loans to total assets at the end of
the year t (NPLi;t) and the rst di¤erence of NPLi;t (NPLi;t = NPLi;t   NPLi;t 1) as
explanatory variables. These two variables are good indicators of the expected loss identied
by banks for their loan portfolio. They should display a positive relationship with loan loss
provisions. We also include the risk of default for the overall credit portfolio, measured by
the ratio of net loans to total assets (Li;t). The coe¢cient associated with this variable should
be positive. Finally, we consider the annual growth rate of GDP ( _yi;t), which should a¤ect
loan loss provisions negatively. Indeed, the creditworthiness of banks customers depends on
the economic condition.
The discretionary component comprises loan loss provisions made to fulll managerial
objectives. First, banks can use loan loss provisions for income smoothing, i.e. banks can
understate (overstate) loan loss provisions when earnings are expected to be low (high). We
consider the ratio of earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions to total assets (ERi;t) to
test if banks use loan loss provisions to smooth their income. A positive relationship between
the variable ERi;t and LLP will be consistent with the income smoothing hypothesis. Second,
banks can use loan loss provisions for capital management. Banks with low regulatory capital
could be more inclined to make loan loss provisions because general LLP are included (to a
certain extent) in Tier 2 capital and are tax deductible in most countries9. We use the total
9The Basel I accord allows general loan loss reserves (which include general loan loss provisions) to count
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capital ratio (TCRi;t) to capture this behavior for European, U.S. and South & East Asian
banks10. We expect a negative relationship with loan loss provisions. However this negative
relationship could also result from the risk proles of banks (Bikker & Metzemakers, 2005).
Riskier banks might record more losses, more loan loss provisions and hold less regulatory
capital. As Bankscope provide limited information on the total capital ratio for Japanese
and Central & South American banks, we alternatively use the ratio of equity to total assets
(Ei;t) to capture the capital management behavior. Third, banks can also use loan loss
provisions to signal their nancial strength. The one-year-ahead change of earnings before
taxes and loan loss provisions (SIGNi;t = ERi;t+1 ERi;t) is generally used in the literature
to capture such behavior. A positive relationship with loan loss provisions would indicate
that banks might signal a future improvement of earnings to their clients and investors by
increasing their loan loss provisions.
The empirical specication for loan loss provisions is therefore given by :
LLPi;t = 0 + 1LLPi;t 1 + 2NPLi;t + 3NPLi;t + 4Li;t + 5 _yi;t (1)
+6ERi;t + 7TCRi;t + 8SIGNi;t + "i;t;
where LLPi;t is the ratio of loan loss provisions (specic provisions plus general provisions)
to total assets at the end of the year t for bank i.
We consider a dynamic adjustment of loan loss provisions. If banks adjust their provisions
slowly to recognize potential losses against loans or if default events are concentrated in time,
then provisions could exhibit time dependency. Dummy variables are included to control for
bank type (commercial, cooperative & mutual or savings banks). In addition, we include
country and time dummies for our European, Central & South American and South & East
Asian datasets. We do not include time dummies for U.S. and Japanese banks since a macro
variable ( _yi;t) is considered in the specication.
Equation (1) is estimated to compute the non-discretionary component and the discre-
toward Tier 2 capital up to a maximum of 1.25% of risk-weighted assets. For banks using the IRB approach,
Basel II changes this limit to 0.6% of credit-risk-weighted assets.
10The capital management behavior will be more accurately captured using Tier1 capital ratio but a
majority of banks do not give specic information on their level of Tier 1 and Tier 2.
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tionary component of LLP. We assume that these two components are linear functions of
the variables included in equation (1).
3.2. The estimation methodology
We use the Blundell and Bond (1998) dynamic panel estimator to estimate equation
(1). This estimator is known as the system GMM estimator. It combines two equations,
the original equation and a transformed one. The transformed equation can be the rst
di¤erence of the original equation. In this paper, we use the forward orthogonal deviations
transformation of the original equation as suggested by Arellano and Bover (1995). In
addition, we report the two-step estimator including the Windmeijer (2005) nite-sample
correction. Finally, to limit the number of instruments, we restrict at 4 the lag range used
in generating the instruments and we use the "collapse option" (Roodman, 2006)11. The
GMM-style instruments are applied only on the lagged dependent variable (LLPi;t 1). The
other variables are considered as strictly exogenous.
The validity of estimates is checked with the AR(2) test and the Hansen test. The AR(2)
test corresponds to the Arellano-Bond test which tests for autocorrelation aside from the
xed e¤ects. The presence of such autocorrelation makes lag 2 invalid as instrument. The
Hansen test allows to check the validity of the whole set of instruments. We also ensure that
there is no multicollinearity problem computing the variance ination factors (VIF) and the
correlation matrix.
Table 2 and 3 presents the results obtained for equation (1). We test the robustness
of our results by considering three alternative specications. In specication (1.a), we only
consider the variables related to the non-discretionary component of loan loss provisions.
In specications (1.b) and (1.c), the discretionary and non-discretionary components are
jointly considered, taking either the total capital ratio (specication (1.b)) or the equity to
total assets ratio (specication (1.c)) to capture the capital management behavior12. Com-
parison between specication (1.a) and (1.b) or (1.c) allows checking that the results are
11With the standard approach, the instrument count depends both on the time period count and the lag
available count. With the "collapse" approach, it depends only on the lag available count.
12Running equation (1) with Ei;t instead of TCRi;t allows to considerably increase the number of ob-
servations for Europe. In addition, specication (1.b) is not performed for Japanese and Central & South
American banks because TCRi;t is only available for a few number of banks in these two datasets.
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stable whether or not we introduce the discretionary component. The proxy used to test
the hypothesis that banks might used loan loss provisions to signal their nancial strength
(SIGNi;t) is never signicant but reduces the sample size as we use one-year-ahead changes
of earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions. Estimates with this variable are therefore
not reported13.
Table 2 presents the results obtained for European and Japanese banks. Estimates for
European banks are run rstly on the whole sample and secondly on the subsample excluding
Italian banks.14 This subsample estimate allows checking if results are driven by the large
number of Italian banks in the European dataset. Table 3 presents the results obtained for
U.S., Central & South America and South & East Asian banks.
3.3. Results
Tables 2 and 3 show that provisioning practices have common features across our di¤erent
datasets. The ratio of non-performing loans (NPLi;t) and the GDP growth rate ( _yi;t) a¤ect
signicantly loan loss provisions in all estimations and the rst di¤erence of the ratio of non-
performing loans (NPLi;t) is not signicant only for South & East Asian banks. These
results support the hypothesis that backward-looking practices lead to a cyclical pattern of
loan loss provisions in all banking systems we consider. The coe¢cient of the GDP growth
rate is between -0.02 for Japanese banks and -0.08 for Central & South American banks.
In addition, the ratio of non-performing loans and its rst di¤erence reach their highest
magnitudes respectively for U.S. banks with 0.16 and for Central & South American banks
with 0.12. The smallest magnitudes are obtained for European banks with a coe¢cient of
0.03 for both NPLi;t and NPLi;t. Concerning the discretionary behavior, our results are
consistent with the hypothesis that banks use loan loss provisions to smooth their income
in all the di¤erent countries we consider. Indeed, the coe¢cient of the ratio of earnings
before taxes and loan loss provisions to total assets (ERi;t) is signicant and positive in all
estimates. The smaller coe¢cient of ERi;t is observed for U.S. banks (0.06) whereas the
13The estimates including the variable SIGNi;t are available upon request.
14We also run estimates for European banks excluding year 2008 from the sample. The Basel II agreement
starts to be implemented in Europe in 2008 and we check therefore that our results are not a¤ected by this
modication in the regulatory framework. These estimates are not reported to save space but are available
upon request.
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highest one is obtained for South & East Asian banks (0.16).
Our results also show that banks from our di¤erent datasets behave di¤erently in some
respects regarding their provisioning practices. Firstly, the coe¢cient of the lagged depen-
dent variable is signicant for European, U.S. and Central & South American banks but not
for Japanese and South and East Asian banks15. This coe¢cient is around 0.30 for U.S.
and Central & South American banks and around 0.20 for European banks. Banks in these
countries therefore adjust loan loss provisions gradually to recognize potential losses against
loans. Secondly, the coe¢cient of the variable net loans to total assets (Li;t) is not signicant
for South & East Asian banks and it is either not signicant or has an unexpected negative
sign depending on the specication for Japanese banks. As a result, this variable does not
seem to correctly capture the risk of default for the overall credit portfolio, or loan loss pro-
visions are not a¤ected by this credit risk measure in these two samples. We note that the
variable Li;t is also not signicant in specication (1.b) for European banks. However, this
could result from a correlation between the variables Li;t and TCRi;t even if the VIF remain
weak. Thirdly, the capital management behavior is not a signicant determinant of loan loss
provisions practices of Central & South American banks. Moreover, although this behavior
is signicant for our whole sample of European banks, subsample estimates in Table 2 show
that this result is driven by the behavior of Italian banks. Coe¢cients of the variables TCRi;t
and Ei;t turn out to be not signicant at the 10% level when Italian banks are excluded from
our European dataset. Lastly, the provisioning behavior of South & East Asian banks is less
accurately captured than for the other datasets. Indeed, the lagged dependent variable and
net loans to total assets do not signicantly a¤ect loan loss provisions. We also note that
the rst di¤erence of the ratio of non-performing loans (NPLi;t) is not signicant and that
the validity of instruments (AR(2) and Hansen tests) is not rejected only at the 5% or 1%
level. These discordant results could be explained by the limited sample available for South
& East Asian banks or by important heterogeneities between provisioning practices between
South East Asian countries.
15We test the robustness of our results by running Equation (1) without the lagged dependent variable for
Japanese and South & East Asiab banks. Results obtained in Table 3 are not modied. Similar results are
also obtained with the xed or random e¤ects estimators. These results are available upon request.
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[Insert Tables 2 and 3]
3.4. Computation of the non-discretionary and the discretionary components of LLP
We use the estimates of equation (1) to compute the non-discretionary and discretionary
components of LLP. It is assumed that these two components are linear functions of the dif-
ferent variables included in equation (1). Thus, they are computed as the sum of the products
of their explanatory variables times the corresponding estimated coe¢cients from equation
(1). More precisely, we use the specication (1.c) which includes both non-discretionary and
discretionary provisioning behavior16. We compute several measures of the non-discretionary
components to test the robustness of our results.
First, the non-discretionary component of LLP is dened by:
NDISC1i;t = 1LLPi;t 1 + 2NPLi;t + 3NPLi;t + 4Li;t + 5 _yi;t; (2)
when all the coe¢cients i are signicant. If a coe¢cient is not signicant or has the opposite
expected sign in equation (1.c), the variable associated with this coe¢cient is dropped17.
Second, we compute a non-discretionary LLP component that excludes the GDP growth
rate ( _yi;t) and includes only bank level variables:
NDISC2i;t = 1LLPi;t 1 + 2NPLi;t + 3NPLi;t + 4Li;t: (3)
This specication allows checking if the possible e¤ect of non-discretionary loan loss provi-
sions on growth in lending does not result from the presence of the GDP growth rate in its
denition.
Third, we compute a non-discretionary LLP that also includes the income smoothing
behavior :
NDISC3i;t = 1LLPi;t 1 + 2NPLi;t + 3NPLi;t + 4Li;t + 5 _yi;t + 6ERi;t: (4)
16The specication (1.b) also considers the non discretionary and the discretionary components of LLP;
but the capital management hypothesis is tested using the total capital ratio (TCRi;t) which is only available
for a few number of banks compared to the ratio of equity to total assets (Ei;t) used in specication (1.c).
17For example, for Japanese banks, we have : NDISC1i;t = 2NPLi;t + 3NPLi;t + 5 _yi;t since the
variable LLPi;t 1 does not have a signicant e¤ect and Li;t has an unexpected negative and signicant sign.
12
The income smoothing behavior could mitigate the cyclical pattern of non-discretionary LLP
and thus their potential e¤ect on growth in lending. Indeed, under the income-smoothing
behavior, banks choose accruals to minimize the variance of reported earnings. This im-
plies that loan loss provisions increase during an expansionary phase and decrease during
a recessionary phase. We can therefore test if such a behavior may o¤set the evolution of
non-discretionary provisions by using NDISC3i;t instead of NDISC1i;t or NDISC2i;t.
Finally, we compute a measure of the discretionary component of LLP dened as:
DISCi;t = LLPi;t  NDISC1i;t: (5)
We assume with such a specication that the discretionary component is fully the part of
loan loss provisions which is not identied as non-discretionary. The advantages of this
denition are twofold. It can be applied for each dataset, regardless of the signicance of
variables capturing the discretionary behavior. It also allows to test if loan loss provisions
that are not identied as discretionary also matter for growth in lending.
These discretionary and non discretionary variables are used to test the impact of provi-
sioning behaviors on bank lending.
4. Provisioning practices and growth in lending
4.1. Specication of growth in lending
We use a similar approach to Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008) to investigate the e¤ect of
the non-discretionary and discretionary components of loan loss provisions on growth in
lending. We estimate several specications since we retained three di¤erent denitions to
compute the non-discretionary component of loan loss provisions. We start with the following
specication:
_Li;t = 0 + 1NDISC1i;t + 2 _Di;t + 3Ei;t 1 + 4TAi;t 1 + ui;t; (6)
where _Li;t is the growth rate of net loans. We expect that the non-discretionary component
(NDISC1i;t) a¤ects growth in lending negatively if the hypothesis that existing backward-
looking provisioning systems exacerbate banks procyclicality behavior is consistent. An
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increasing cost of lending represented by a rise of non-discretionary loan loss provisions
should reduce a banks incentive to expand its loans. We control for the growth rate of
deposits ( _Di;t), the equity ratio (Ei;t 1)
18 and the size measured by the logarithm of total
assets (TAi;t 1). Dummy variables are also included in the specication to control for bank
type (commercial, cooperative & mutual or savings banks), time e¤ect and country e¤ect.
Time and country dummies allow us to control for changing macroeconomic conditions.
The e¤ect of non-discretionary loan loss provisions on growth in lending is also estimated
alternatively with variables NDISC2i;t and NDISC3i;t instead of NDISC1i;t. We expect
that considering NDISC2i;t instead of NDISC1i;t should not modify the results of the esti-
mation. Our results should be robust to whether or not the GDP growth rate is included in
the non-discretionary component. In addition, consideringNDISC3i;t instead ofNDISC1i;t
could modify the results. If NDISC3i;t turns out to be not signicant while NDISC1i;t is
signicant, this would indicate that income smoothing behavior would mitigate the e¤ect of
non-discretionary loan loss provisions on growth in lending.
We consider a last specication in which we include jointly the variables NDISC1i;t and
DISCi;t: We expect that controlling for the discretionary component should not modify the
e¤ect of non-discretionary loan loss provisions on credit variations. Moreover, we do not
have any a priori about the e¤ect of DISCi;t on growth in lending.
Equation (6) is estimated with the system GMM estimator. As the non-discretionary
(NDISC1i;t, NDISC2i;t or NDISC3i;t) and the discretionary components (DISCi;t) of
LLP are computed using the coe¢cients from the estimate of equation (1), they might
contain measurement error. These variables are therefore instrumented to deal with this
problem. Variable _Di;t is also instrumented because it could be endogenous. We restrict at 4
the lag range used in generating the instruments and we use the "collapse option" (Roodman,
2006) to limit the number of instruments. Variables Ei;t 1 and TAi;t 1 are included with a
lag to avoid simultaneity and endogeneity problems. They are therefore not instrumented
with GMM-style instruments.
4.2. Empirical results
18Considering the equity ratio (Ei;t 1) rather than the total capital ratio (TCRi;t 1) allows to estimate
the same specication for each sample.
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Tables 4 and 5 display our results for the di¤erent datasets. Four specications are re-
ported for each dataset. Specication (2.a) corresponds to the estimation of equation (6). In
specication (2.b), variable NDISC2i;t is considered instead of variable NDISC1i;t while in
specication (2.c), variable NDISC3i;t is considered instead of variable NDISC1i;t: Speci-
cation (2.d) includes both the non-discretionary componentNDISC1i;t and the discretionary
component DISCi;t.
The coe¢cient associated with the growth rate of deposits ( _Di;t) is positive and signi-
cant in the four specications for all datasets. The magnitude of the coe¢cient is smallest
for South and East Asian banks and highest for U.S. banks. Concerning the two other con-
trol variables, the equity ratio (Ei;t 1) and the size (TAi;t 1), the estimated coe¢cients are
negative but turn frequently non signicant.
In specication (2.a), variable NDISC1i;t has a negative and signicant e¤ect at the
1% or 5% level in all datasets except for Japanese banks, where it is not signicant. This
negative impact of non-discretionary loan loss provisions on growth in lending suggests that
backward-looking provisioning practices a¤ect cyclicality in bank lending. Low specic loan
loss provisions during upswing phases of the economic cycle encourage banks to expand
credit, whereas the sudden identication of problem loans during downturns constrains banks
to make loan loss provisions, which reduces their incentive to supply new credits. The
sensitivity of growth in lending to non-discretionary loan loss provisions is however di¤erent
depending on the banking system19. The highest coe¢cient is observed for European banks
(-15.07) and the lowest e¤ect (excluding Japanese banks) is obtained for U.S. banks (-3.83)20.
The estimated coe¢cient for Central & South American banks (-3.84) is close to the lowest
value while the coe¢cient for South and East Asian banks (-15.05) is close to the one obtained
for European banks. Concerning the sample of European banks without Italy, the coe¢cient
19With backward-looking practices, cyclical factors such as the evolution of non performing loans or more
generally the economic situation determine loan loss provisions (i.e. have a direct e¤ect on banks prots)
and then a¤ect bank lending. Note that with our approach we do not estimate directly the marginal e¤ect
of loan loss provisions on loan growth.
20The high value of the coe¢cient is explained by the di¤erence of scale between loan loan provisions and
the growth rate of loans. Descriptive statistics in Table 1 show that the lowest value of the mean of LLP is
observed for US banks (0.28%) and the highest value for Central & South American banks (1.64%), whereas
the mean of the growth rate of loans ranges from 2.29% for Japanese banks to 11.71% for South & East
Asian banks.
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(-13.52) is slightly lower than the one obtained for the whole sample of European banks.
Specication (2.b) in tables 4 and 5 shows that we obtain similar results when we use
variable NDISC2i;t (excluding the GDP growth rate) instead of NDISC1i;t: It implies that
the negative impact of non-discretionary loan loss provisions on growth in lending does not
depend on the e¤ect of the GDP growth rate on LLP.
In specication (2.c), the e¤ect of non-discretionary loan loss provisions on growth in
lending is captured by the variable NDISC3i;t which includes the proxy used to capture the
income smoothing behavior. As in specications (2.a) and (2.b), we nd a signicant and
negative coe¢cient associated with NDISC3i;t for European, U.S., South & East Asian and
Central & South American banks. This variable is not signicant only for Japanese banks,
as previously. These results imply that the income smoothing behavior does not mitigate
the e¤ect of non-discretionary loan loss provisions on growth in lending. We can, however,
note that the coe¢cients associated with variable NDISC3i;t are slightly weaker (in absolute
value) than the ones obtained for variable NDISC1i;t, but the income smoothing behavior
is not strong enough to completely o¤set the evolution of non-discretionary provisions. Our
results therefore highlight that the income smoothing behavior is not the appropriate solution
to mitigate the cyclical pattern of non-discretionary loan loss provisions and to dampen their
e¤ect on growth in lending. The appropriate solution could come from the banking regulator
with the implementation of a dynamic provisioning system. In such a system, the current
cyclical pattern of loan loss provisions will be mechanically mitigated and consequently their
e¤ect on growth in lending will be limited.
We further jointly consider, in specication (2.d), the e¤ect of the non-discretionary
component and the total discretionary component (DISCi;t) of LLP on growth in lending.
The coe¢cient of the non-discretionary component remains negative and signicant as in
specications (2.a), (2.b) and (2.c), while the e¤ect of the discretionary component of LLP
is not signicant at the 10% level. Loan loss provisions which are not made to cover expected
losses are therefore not relevant to determine growth in lending.
[Insert Tables 4 and 5]
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Overall we nd that the non-discretionary component of LLP amplies the credit cycle
for all the developed and emerging countries we consider, except for Japan. It implies that a
backward-looking provisioning system leads banks to underestimate expected credit risk and
as a consequence reduce non-discretionary LLP during an economic upswing. Conversely,
banks have to charge provisions too late during the downturn. Bank prots and subsequently
bank capital are directly a¤ected which decrease the banks incentive to grant new loans and
increase the cyclicality of its lending. Our results suggest that such an impact of loan loss
provisions on bank lending does not exist in Japan. This can be explained by the specici-
ties of the Japanese banking system. Descriptive statistics in Table 1 show that Japanese
banks have the highest non-performing loans ratio but make few loan loss provisions. In
addition, they have the lowest ROE, ROA and growth rate of bank lending. With all these
characteristics, it makes sense that non-discretionary loan loss provisions have no e¤ect on
growth in bank lending.
4.3. Simulation exercise
We further simulate a shock on the non-discretionary component of loan loss provisions
to appreciate the magnitude of its impact on the growth of bank lending in the di¤erent
group of countries we consider. We use the estimates of specication (2.a) (see Tables 4 and
5) to graphically represent the e¤ects of two di¤erent shocks on the bank lending growth
rate (see Figure 1).
Firstly, we consider a shock of the same amplitude for all the countries by considering an
increase of 0.3 for the non-discretionary component of LLP (NDISC1i;t). Such an increase
corresponds roughly to one standard error ofNDISC1i;t for the developed countries (Europe,
Japan or the U.S.), but not for emerging countries where the standard error of NDISC1i;t
is higher (1.64 for Central & South America and 0.54 for South & East Asia). The response
of the bank lending growth rate to this increase in non-discretionary LLP directly depends
on the coe¢cient of NDISC1i;t (Tables 4 and 5). Figure 1 shows that the response to
this shock is stronger for Europe and South & East Asia, with a magnitude of -4.5%. The
magnitude of the responses is lower and almost identical for the U.S. and Central & South
America (-1,1%), but they are signicant according to estimates in Table 5. Japan presents
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the lowest decrease in the bank lending growth rate (-0.5%) and this can be considered as
not signicant according to estimates in Table 4.
Secondly, we consider a shock of di¤erent amplitude for each group of countries in order to
take into account that the range of variation ofNDISC1i;t is not similar across countries. We
simulate for that the impact of an increase in the non-discretionary component corresponding
to one standard error of NDISC1i;t. We can see in Figure 1 that the responses of the growth
rate in bank lending to this shock for developed countries are not very di¤erent from the ones
obtained with the rst shock. The amplitude of the rst and the second shocks are mainly
similar for these countries21. The e¤ect remains stronger in Europe than in the U.S. and it
is not signicant in Japan. Interestingly, the magnitude of this second shock is very di¤erent
for our two groups of emerging countries. The response of the growth rate in bank lending
is -6,3% for Central & South America and -8,3% for South & East Asia. More important
swings in non-discretionary loan loss provisions lead therefore to stronger variations in bank
lending in emerging countries than in developed countries.
These results highlight that it is important to not only consider the coe¢cient associated
with the non-discretionary component NDISC1i;t but also the variation occurring in non-
discretionary loan loss provisions to accurately evaluate the impact of provisioning practices
on growth in bank lending. Our results show that backward backward-looking provisioning
systems exacerbate banks lending uctuations in both developed and emerging countries,
but with a stronger impact for emerging countries.
[Insert Figure 1]
5. Conclusion
We examined whether backward-looking provisioning practices amplify growth in bank
lending. This is of obvious interest from a public policy point of view, as banking regulation
should move toward a dynamic provisioning system if existing backward looking provisioning
system increase the procyclicality of bank lending. We conducted a comparative study on
three samples of developed countries (Europe, Japan and the United States) and two samples
of emerging countries (Central & South America and South & East Asia).
21The standard error of NDISC1i;t is respectively 0.24 for Europe, 0.31 for Japan and 0.34 for the U.S.
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We nd that backward-looking provisioning practices amplify the cyclicality of bank
lending, with a stronger impact for emerging countries. Indeed, our results show that the
non-discretionary component of LLP has a negative and signicant e¤ect on growth in bank
lending in all the countries we considered, except for Japan, with a higher amplitude for
emerging countries. A backward-looking provisioning system implies that during an eco-
nomic upswing, banks tend to underestimate expected credit risk and as a consequence
reduce non-discretionary LLP. Banks incentives to grant new loans are therefore reinforced
since lending costs are understated. On the other hand, sudden identication of problem
loans during an economic downturn constrains banks to make non-discretionary loan loss
provisions, which reduces their incentive to supply new credit.
Countries with a backward-looking provisioning system could therefore benet from the
implementation of a dynamic provisioning one. As we nd that backward-looking provision-
ing practices impact on growth in lending for Europe, the United States, Central & South
America and South & East Asia, it should facilitate the adoption of a dynamic provisioning
system at the international level. We showed that the advantages of such a system could be
even more relevant for emerging countries and Europe than for the United States.
Regulators should combine capital measures and a forward-looking provisioning system
that are designed to complement each other to address procyclicality as suggested by the
Basel Committee. The reform of the provisioning system should focus on strengthening the
banking system against expected losses, while the capital measures focus on unexpected
losses. However, such a reform advocates an important change in the accounting standards
towards an expected loss approach. The Basel Committee has issued a set of high level
guiding principles that should govern the reforms to the replacement of IAS 39.
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Table 1: General descriptive statistics on average over the period of analysis
European banks
(whole sample)
1995  2008
European banks
(without Italy)
1995  2008
Japanese
banks
1998  2008
US banks
1995  2008
Central & South
American banks
1995  2008
South & East
Asian banks
1998  2008
L 62.21
(20.55)
66.79
(24.53)
56.55
(11.45)
64.99
(14.70)
51.96
(19.84)
57.44
(16.52)
D 64.41
(15.18)
73.95
(15.04)
92.16
(6.67)
81.49
(9.56)
64.92
(22.85)
76.79
(14.38)
NPL 3.67
(3.56)
2.45
(3.26)
5.28
(3.14)
0.66
(1.12)
4.36
(5.59)
4.43
(5.41)
LLP 0.33
(0.48)
0.26
(0.58)
0.43
(0.51)
0.28
(0.59)
1.64
(2.63)
0.76
(1.02)
E 9.80
(5.33)
7.98
(6.01)
5.18
(2.02)
10.37
(3.72)
15.88
(13.84)
10.91
(8.63)
TCR 16.96
(8.25)
15.07
(5.67)
16.28
(7.27)
16.99
(12.51)
ROA 0.64
(0.79)
0.60
(0.97)
-0.02
(0.63)
0.93
(0.98)
1.28
(4.14)
0.77
(1.59)
ROE 7.08
(7.80)
7.98
(9.87)
-1.46
(14.83)
9.53
(9.04)
10.80
(18.29)
6.71
(15.82)
ER 1.28
(0 94)
1.12
(1.21)
0.49
(0.47)
1.51
(1.21)
3.32
(4.69)
1.79
(1.62)
_L 11.32
(15.26)
7.96
(16.44)
2.29
(11.92)
9.51
(15.54)
9.38
(32.47)
11.71
(18.79)
_D 7.85
(15.32)
6.88
(17.25)
4.44
(12.36)
8.16
(14.12)
9.45
(32.44)
11.48
(19.99)
No. banks 1636 842 689 9421 632 245
Obs. 7684 3158 4623 63244 2885 1287
Variable denitions (all variables are expressed in percentages): L=net loans/total assets; D=deposits/total assets; NPL=non performing
loans/ total assets; LLP=loan loss provisions/total assets; E=total equity investments/total assets; TCR=total capital ratio; ROA=return on
assets; ROE=return on equity; ER=earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions/total assets; _L=growth rate of net loans; _D=growth rate of
total deposits. Standard deviations are in brackets.
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Table 2: The decomposition of loan loss provisions
Endogenous variable : LLPi;t
European banks
(whole sample)
(1:a) (1:b) (1:c)
European banks
(without Italy)
(1:a) (1:b) (1:c)
Japanese
banks
(1:a) (1:c)
LLPi;t 1 0.1900a
(0.0607)
0.2519a
(0.0419)
0.1722a
(0.0490)
0.1858b
(0.0844)
0.2540a
(0.0767)
0.1682b
(0.0679)
-0.0182
(0.0310)
-0.0209
(0.0366)
NPLi;t 0.0391a
(0.0059)
0.0361a
(0.0042)
0.0391a
(0.0055)
0.0485a
(0.0148)
0.0941a
(0.0156)
0.0468a
(0.0136)
0.0837a
(0.0060)
0.0725a
(0.0061)
NPLi;t 0.0388a
(0.0098)
0.0312a
(0.0090)
0.0358a
(0.0086)
0.0801a
(0.0242)
0.0881a
(0.0292)
0.0774a
(0.0275)
0.0770a
(0.0103)
0.0755a
(0.0080)
Li;t 0.0033a
(0.0004)
0.0005
(0.0005)
0.0024a
(0.0004)
0.0033a
(0.0008)
0.0005
(0.0011)
0.0025a
(0.0008)
0.0009
(0.0009)
-0.0028a
(0.0009)
_yi;t -0.0504a
(0.0108)
-0.0463a
(0.0096)
-0.0508a
(0.0104)
-0.0569a
(0.0138)
-0.0290a
(0.0131)
-0.0614a
(0.0144)
-0.0210a
(0.005)
-0.0201a
(0.0059)
ERi;t 0.0800a
(0.0157)
0.0822a
(0.0272)
0.1182a
(0.0248)
0.0813c
(0.0437)
0.0804a
(0.0308)
TCRi;t -0.0062a
(0.0013)
-0.0062
(0.0044)
Ei;t -0.0051c
(0.0028)
-0.0010
(0.0046)
-0.0437a
(0.0081)
Dummies :
Time
Country
Type
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
AR(2) test 0:840 0:343 0:947 0:511 0:682 0:646 0:937 0:715
Hansen test 0:377 0:939 0:542 0:336 0:968 0:385 0:278 0:114
No. banks 1637 1140 1636 842 368 842 692 689
Obs. 7689 5456 7684 3161 1198 3158 4632 4623
Note: a, b and c indicate signicance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard deviations are in brackets.
Variable denitions : LLP i;t: loan loss provisions/total assets; NPLi;t: non performing loans/total assets;
NPLi;t=NPLi;t NPLi;t 1; Li;t: net loans/total assets; _yi;t: GDP growth rate; ERi;t: earnings before taxes and loan loss
provisions/total assets; TCRi;t: total capital ratio; Ei;t: total equity investments/total assets.
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Table 3: The decomposition of loan loss provisions
Endogenous variable : LLPi;t
US banks
(1:a) (1:b) (1:c)
Central & South
American banks
(1:a) (1:c)
South & East
Asian banks
(1:a) (1:b) (1:c)
LLPi;t 1 0.3347a
(0.0351)
0.3221a
(0.0328)
0.3372a
(0.0268)
0.3388a
(0.0632)
0.3033a
(0.0618)
0.1171a
(0.0416)
0.0707
(0.0558)
0.0736
(0.0498)
NPLi;t 0.1606a
(0.0158)
0.1647a
(0.0177)
0.1659a
(0.0170)
0.1155a
(0.0223)
0.1205a
(0.0224)
0.0788a
(0.0222)
0.0984a
(0.0218)
0.0722a
(0.0178)
NPLi;t 0.0632a
(0.0132)
0.0636a
(0.0133)
0.0574a
(0.0128)
0.1489a
(0.0236)
0.1209a
(0.0226)
0.0391
(0.0306)
0.0303
(0.0328)
0.0189
(0.0220)
Li;t 0.0032a
(0.0002)
0.0010a
(0.0002)
0.0022a
(0.0002)
0.0090a
(0.0029)
0.0060b
(0.0024)
0.0005
(0.0026)
-0.0017
(0.0033)
-0.0021
(0.0021)
_yi;t -0.0410a
(0.0022)
-0.0428a
(0.0022)
-0.0437a
(0.0021)
-0.0949a
(0.0133)
-0.0825a
(0.0141)
-0.0345a
(0.0122)
-0.0299b
(0.0146)
-0.0271b
(0.0109)
ERi;t 0.0686a
(0.0124)
0.0663a
(0.0116)
0.1394a
(0.0312)
0.1153b
(0.0536)
0.1600a
(0.0472)
TCRi;t -0.0054a
(0.0005)
-0.0120a
(0.0037)
Ei;t -0.0076a
(0.0014)
-0.0033
(0.0047)
-0.0217a
(0.0079)
Dummies :
Time
Country
Type
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
AR(2) test 0:124 0:130 0:121 0:663 0:712 0:085 0:144 0:059
Hansen test 0:155 0:028 0:161 0:498 0:515 0:083 0:045 0:063
No. banks 9422 9413 9421 637 632 246 228 245
Obs. 63265 63184 63244 2904 2885 1294 1141 1287
Note: a, b and c indicate signicance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard deviations are in brackets.
Variable denitions : LLP i;t: loan loss provisions/total assets; NPLi;t: non performing loans/total assets;
NPLi;t=NPLi;t NPLi;t 1; Li;t: net loans/total assets; _yi;t: GDP growth rate; ERi;t: earnings before taxes and loan loss
provisions/total assets; TCRi;t: total capital ratio; Ei;t: total equity investments/total assets.
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Table 4: Backward looking provisioning rules and growth in bank lending
Endogenous variable : _Li;t
European banks
(whole sample)
(2:a) (2:b) (2:c) (2:d)
European banks
(without Italy)
(2:a) (2:b) (2:c) (2:d)
Japanese banks
(2:a) (2:b) (2:c) (2:d)
NDISC1i;t
-15:07a -7:08b
(5:40) (3:12)
-13:52b -7:65b
(5:61) (3:46)
-1:68 -1:04
(1:90) (2:26)
NDISC2i;t
-15:21a
(5:90)
-13:12b
(5:83)
-1:58
(1:93)
NDISC3i;t
-11:23b
(5:19)
-14:90b
(6:17)
-2:15
(1:93)
DISCi;t
-3:84
(10:09)
-4:71
(6:26)
-0:32
(2:19)
_Di;t
0:94a 0:96a 0:96a 0:92a
(0:15) (0:15) (0:16) (0:16)
0:72a 0:73a 0:65a 0:75a
(0:15) (0:15) (0:14) (0:14)
0:73a 0:71a 0:77a 0:82a
(0:14) (0:14) (0:16) (0:16)
Ei;t 1
-0:08c -0:09c -0:07 -0:05
(0:04) (0:05) (0:05) (0:05)
-0:18b -0:19a -0:08 -0:19b
(0:07) (0:07) (0:07) (0:08)
-0:11 -0:10 -0:14 -0:12
(0:09) (0:09) (0:10) (0:11)
TAi;t 1
-0:61a -0:62a -0:42a -0:42a
(0:18) (0:19) (0:16) (0:14)
-0:75a -0:74a -0:86a -0:49b
(0:27) (0:27) (0:32) (0:20)
-0:18 -0:17 -0:21 -0:13
(0:12) (0:12) (0:13) (0:14)
Dummies :
Time
Country
Type
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
AR(2) test 0:729 0:709 0:773 0:767 0:098 0:097 0:113 0:066 0:239 0:248 0:195 0:632
Hansen test 0:402 0:690 0:425 0:326 0:460 0:697 0:585 0:673 0:331 0:305 0:258 0:029
No. banks 1605 1605 1605 1605 825 825 825 825 687 687 687 687
Obs. 7273 7273 7273 7273 2948 2948 2948 2948 4599 4599 4599 4599
Note: a, b and c indicate signicance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard deviations are in brackets.
Variable denitions : _Li;t: growth rate of net loans (in percentage); _Di;t: growth rate of total deposits (in percentage); NDISC1i;t,
NDISC2i;t and NDISC3i;t: the non discretionary component of LLP; DISCi;t: the discretionary component of LLP; Ei;t: total equity
investments/total assets; TAi;t: logarithme of total assets.
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Table 5: Backward looking provisioning rules and growth in bank lending
Endogenous variable : _Li;t
US banks
(2:a) (2:b) (2:c) (2:d)
Central & South
American banks
(2:a) (2:b) (2:c) (2:d)
South & East
Asian banks
(2:a) (2:b) (2:c) (2:d)
NDISC1i;t
-3:83a -3:65a
(0:57) (0:63)
-3:84b -3:28b
(1:55) (1:32)
-15:05a -15:98a
(3:08) (4:75)
NDISC2i;t
-3:80a
(0:57)
-2:75b
(1:39)
-15:00a
(3:37)
NDISC3i;t
-3:80a
(0:56)
-2:50c
(1:42)
-11:08a
(2:89)
DISCi;t
-3:80
(3:84)
-0:38
(1:92)
3:24
(4:48)
_Di;t
1:11a 1:11a 1:11a 1:08a
(0:04) (0:04) (0:04) (0:05)
0:95a 0:97a 1:01a 0:97a
(0:16) (0:15) (0:17) (0:17)
0:36b 0:30c 0:32c 0:65a
(0:17) (0:16) (0:17) (0:22)
Ei;t 1
-0:26a -0:26a -0:25a -0:23a
(0:05) (0:05) (0:05) (0:06)
-0:20a -0:19a -0:18a -0:19a
(0:05) (0:05) (0:06) (0:06)
-0:08 -0:07 -0:02 -0:11
(0:06) (0:05) (0:06) (0:13)
TAi;t 1
-0:07 -0:07 -0:12 -0:20
(0:07) (0:07) (0:07) (0:14)
-0:31 -0:17 -0:16 -0:26
(0:44) (0:42) (0:45) (0:47)
-1:06b -1:06b -0:77 -0:52
(0:47) (0:46) (0:48) (0:64)
Dummies :
Time
Country
Type
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
AR(2) test 0:421 0:418 0:444 0:214 0:728 0:697 0:791 0:713 0:872 0:768 0:977 0:602
Hansen test 0:154 0:147 0:121 0:020 0:137 0:744 0:220 0:236 0:360 0:699 0:336 0:015
No. banks 9323 9323 9323 9323 614 614 614 614 231 231 231 231
Obs. 62152 62152 62152 62152 2614 2614 2614 2614 1121 1121 1121 1121
Note: a, b and c indicate signicance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard deviations are in brackets.
Variable denitions : _Li;t: growth rate of net loans (in percentage); _Di;t: growth rate of total deposits (in percentage); NDISC1i;t,
NDISC2i;t and NDISC3i;t: the non discretionary component of LLP; DISCi;t: the discretionary component of LLP; Ei;t: total equity
investments/total assets; TAi;t: logarithme of total assets.
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Figure 1: E¤ect of an increase in non discretionary component of LLP on growth in bank lending
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Simulation with an increase of 0.3 of non
discretionary LLP
Simulation with an increase of one standard
error of non discretionary LLP
Europe
(whole sample)
Europe
(without Italy)
Japan USA Central & South
America
South &
East Asia
% Note : The standard error of non discretionary loan loss provisions is 0.24 for Europe (whole
sample), 0.30 for Europe (without Italy), 0.31 for Japan, 0.34 for the US, 1.64 for Central &
South America and 0.54 for South & East Asia.
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Appendix:
Table A1. Distribution of banks by country and type
Country
Total number
of banks
Commercial
banks
Savings
banks
Mutual &
cooperative banks
Europe 1636 546 469 621
- Denmark 70 49 20 1
- France 266 164 29 73
- Italy 794 186 75 533
- Norway 130 20 110 0
- Spain 46 10 28 8
- Sweden 62 19 43 0
- Switzerland 237 67 162 8
- U.K. 31 31 0 0
United States 9421 8447 974 0
Central & South America 632 581 11 40
- Argentina 80 73 2 5
- Bolivia 17 17 0 0
- Brazil 170 168 0 2
- Chile 44 44 0 0
- Colombia 47 45 0 2
- Costa Rica 44 17 1 26
- Ecuador 38 37 1 0
- Mexico 41 41 0 0
- Paraguay 23 23 0 0
- Peru 30 30 0 0
- Uruguay 36 31 0 5
- Venezuela 62 55 7 0
Japan 689 149 0 540
South & East Asia 245 232 11 2
- Indonesia 53 53 0 0
- South Korea 17 17 0 0
- Malaysia 43 42 0 1
- Philippines 47 37 10 0
- Taiwan 63 62 0 1
- Thailand 22 21 1 0
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